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THE CORPORATE TRUSTEE BECOMES
AN INSURER
ELLA GRAUBART*

Recently the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania injected into the law of
trusts a principle so foreign to the basic concept of the trust relationship, that
it becomes important to examine the issues involved.
In the cases before the court' a trust company had entered into agreements with its customers, by which it accepted trust funds for investment
in such securities as the law of Pennsylvania permitted for the investment of
trust funds, and guaranteed the payment of interest at 59o, and the return of

the principal sum upon notice of revocation" of the agreement.
The agreements in the four cases before the court vary in phraseology,
but the unmistakable import of each is that the trust company guaranteed a
specified rate of interest on the investment, and the return of the cash invested upon revocation of the agreement by either the donor or the trust company.
Under each agreement, the trust company being limited in its investment
of the cash received to those securities proper for the investment of trust
funds, 2 invested the money received in mortgages.
College,
New York City, 1917; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh
*A.B., Hunter
Law School, 1927; admitted to practice, 1927; member of the firm of Patterson, Craw.
ford, Arensberg & Dunn, Pittsburgh, Pa.
1Robert's
Trust Estate,
2Act of
Sec 1; 1923,

Trust Estate, 316 Pa. 545; Whitty's Trust Estate, 316 Pa. 551; Frey's
316 Pa. 551.
1917, P.L. 447, Sec. 41a, as amended by Act of 1923, Mar. 19, P.L. 2),
June 29, P.L. 955, Sec. 1; 1929, April 26, P.L. 817, Sec. 1: "When a

fiduciary shall have in his hands any moneys, the principal or capital whereof is to reman for a time in his possession or under his control, and the interest, profits,
or income whereof are to be paid away or to accumulate, or when the income
of real estate shall be more than sufficient for the purpose of the trust, such
fiduciary may invest such moneys in the stock or public debt of the United States; or
in the public debt of this Commonwealth; or in bonds or certificates of debt constiboroughs,
tuting the direct and general obligation of any of the counties, cities,
or
in
first
districts or poor districts of this Commonwealth,
townships, school
mortgages on real estate in this Commonwealth, securing bonds or other obligations
value
of
such
real
estate;
two-thirds
of
the
fair
not exceeding
in amount
or
in
bonds,
payable
not
in
ground
rents in
this Commonwealth;
or
more than twenty years after date, of one or more individuals, secured by a deed or
deeds of unencumbered real estate in this Commonwealth conveyed to a corporation
organized under the laws of this Commonwealth and authorized to act as trustees, in
Lust for the benefit of all such bondholders, but the total amount of any such bond
issue shall not exceed two-thirds of the fair value of the real estate securing it, and the
trustee shall not be exempted, by contract or otherwise, from responsibility foe -per.
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In one case, 3 the investment was in participations in two mortgages; in
the other three cases, the investment was in a mortgage pool managed by the
trust company. The pool consisted of mortgages, the principal of which aggregated over five million dollars, the investment representing the funds of
testamentary trusts, guardianships, and trusts inter vivos. On the books of
the trust company, the interest of each cestui que trust in the pool of mortgages
was indicated, as required by statute, 4 and for such interest a certificate would
have been issued, if requested by the beneficiary. The law of Pennsylvania
permits the investment of trust funds, not only in single mortgages and partici-'
pations in large mortgages but also in pools of mortgages. 6
The experience of growing trust companies during the 20 years prior to
1929 had been that the influx of trust money exceeded the withdrawal of trust
funds. It was therefore possible at all times to take cash trust funds coming in
and awaiting investment, and to pay them to a withdrawing cestui que trust,
and to assign the investment of the terminated trust to the new trust estate.
For example, if an investment had been made in a three-year mortgage, and
the trust terminated or was revoked two years later, although the principal of
the mortgage was not payable for another year, the withdrawing cestui que
trust was given his estate in cash, which he usually preferred. This was possible
only because the trust company had cash in new trusts awaiting investment,
and could assign the three-year mortgage to a new trust estate and pay the
cash coming from the new trust to the withdrawing cestui que trust.
forming the ordinary duties of trustees; or in trust certificates, issued by a trust company organized under the laws of this Commonwealth, certifying that the holders
thereof are respectively the owners of undivided interests in deposits, with such trust
company, of securities in
provisions of this clause:

which the trust funds may be invested under
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall

fiduciary to make any investment contrary to the directions
of the decedent in regard to the investment of such moneys."
See

Latshaw's

gRobert's Trust
4

Estate,

17

D.

& C.

27

contained

the preceding
authorize any

in

the

will

(Pa.)

Estate, supra

Act of 1925, P. L. 152, amending Clause V of Sec. 29 of Act of 1874, P.L.
73, as reenacted by Act of 1899, P.L. 159, Sec. 1. Clause V provides: "'Provided, that
every such company shall have the right to clear receipts and payments of trust money
iii the regular course of business in the same manner as other funds held by it: And

provided further that said companies

may assign to their various

trust estates, participa-

tion in a general trust fund of mortgages upon real estate securing bonds, in which
case it shall be a sufficient compliance with the provisions of this section for the cons-

pany to designate clearly on its records, the bonds and mortgages composing suzi
general trust fund, the names of the trust estates participating therein and the amounts
of the respective participations, and in such case no estate so participating shall be
deemed to

have individual

ownership

in any bond

and

mortgage

in such

fund, and

the

company shall have the right at any time tN repurchase, at market value, but not less
than face value, any such bonds and mortgages from said fund, with the right to
sabstitute therefor other bonds and niortgages.'"
&So@ Note 4, sxtra
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From this experience, the conviction grew that the trust company could
rely on the steady continuance of such conditions, and in the years following
the war the trust companies entered into agreements of trust in which the
trust company expressly assumed the obligation to pay interest at a specified
rate on the investment, and cash upon the termination of the trust, without
regard to the income or value of the security itself. For years this practice
obtained and the trust companies flourished.
With the years of depression came the collapse of the mortgage investment due to the wholesale default of mortgagors and in addition the end of that
influx of trust funds awaiting investment, which had made possible the
payment of cash to all beneficiaries upon termination of their trusts. Withdrawing trusts far exceeded incoming trusts. No new cash funds were available to pay outgoing cestuis que trustents.
In the case of testamentary trusts, where investments were made in mortgages and the mortgages could not be immediately converted into cash, a distribution was made in kind to the beneficiary under the statute providing for
6
such distribution.
Where the investment under a testamentary trust was in a participation
in a mortgage or in a pool of mortgages, the delivery of a certificate showing the interest of the beneficiary was decreed in lieu of cash.'
Likewise, in the case of trusts inter vivos, where there was no express
agreement to return anything but the trust res, distribution of the security
itself or a cerificate, upon termination or revocation of the trust, was proper.
Where the agreement was ambiguous, as for instance where the trust company agreed to return the funds upon 90 days' notice, the court interpreted the
agreement to mean a return of the investment, and not the return of cash.'
But in the cases recently decided, the import of the language was
conceded by the parties to mean that cash was intended to be returned upon
revocation of the trust agreement. The court accordingly, without reference
to the investments, ordered the trust company in each case to pay cash to the
withdrawing cestui que trust.
These decisions strike at the fundamental concept of the trust relationship
and destroy completely the design of the fiduciary principle.
GAct of 1917, P.L. 49

(e). as follows: "(e)

1. Whenever it shall appear, at the

audit and distribution of an estate in the Orphans' Court, that the balance, after paymnnt of debts, includes stocks, bonds, or other securities, which, for reasons satisfactory
to said court, have not been converted by the accountants, it shall be lawful for said
court to direct distribution of such assets in kind, to and among
thereto, including fiduciaries."
7

See Note 4, supra
8Crick's Estate, 315 Pa. 581.

those lawfully entitleA
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The law which has developed around the trust concept is founded upon the
single postulate that one person holds property belonging to another, for the
management of which he owes the highest duty of good faith. Every trust
relationship presupposes a res belonging to the owner, which is transferred to
another to be managed for the benefit of the owner. This has been the conception of trusts in the English Common Law since uses were first introduced
in England by the clergy to avoid the operation of the Statute of Mortmain, and
were employed during the Wars of the Roses to prevent the forfeiture of
estates for treason. The same concept was known and acknowledged long
before in the Civil Law.9
There is little in the history of the law of trusts to indicate whether
or not trustees have heretofore ever attempted to add to the duties which the
law imposed upon them, independent promises of their own. Before the recent
development of trusts into vivos, trusts generally arose in wills in which the
trustee, usually designated without its knowledge, had no opportunity to
make promises; the testator fixed the terms of the trust and the trustee
could not vary these. It could accept or renounce the trust, but there was
no occasion to make any affirmative promises with respect to the relationship.
That was finally fixed by the provisions of the will and the rules of law applicable to the conduct of trustees.
In the ordinary declaration of trust by a living donor, the donor makes
the provisions and the trustee merely accepts the trust, and with it the
responsibility which the instrument and the law impose upon the trustee.
With the development of trusts inter vivos and the growth of trust companies came the trust agreement, drawn by the trustee, in which the trustee
saw an opportunity to increase its "trust business" by making affirmative
promises. At first they were merely declaratory of the law applicable to the duties
of a trutee, but with the increase of trust business and the anticipation of
continuing growth, the trust companies gradually extended their liability until
they finally guaranteed or insured the trust investment.
Before discussing the effect of enforcing such agreements againsr trustees,
an understanding of the nature of the promise to pay cash upon termination
of the trust is necessary. 10 Although words of guarantee are used in some of
the agreements, it is apparent that no guaranty is involved."' The trust company
9Perry - Law of Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 1, Sections 2 and 3.
l 0 Agreement in Robert's Case provides: "IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED
that this trust shall continue until terminated upon thirty days' notice given in writing
by either of the parties hereto, and the Trustee shall thereupon pay over, transfer and
deliver unto me the said trust estate in cash."
IlAgreements in Whiy and Frey Cases provide: "The second party, in consideratiou of the terms of the guarantee hereinafter mentioned, guarantees to the first party:
(a) Payment of the prixcipal sum or ay pars thereof three (3) mouths after detuia

ka

been made by the first party.'"
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,agrees to invest trust funds in such securities as are legal for the investment
of trust funds under the statutes. It may invest in government securities or
in mortgages, which do not mature for many years. It is not guaranteeing payment by the primary debtor upon maturity of the latter's obligation. It is
agreeing to pay the sum invested in the security at any time the donor chooses
to revoke the trust, without reference to the maturity of the iecurity in which
the trust funds are invested. This is not a guaranty.
'Nor is it a surety, for the obligation to pay is not dependent upon the
terms of the mortgage or bond in which the trust funds are invested, nor upon
the obligor's rights or duties.
Is the promise to pay cash upon revocation of the trust, a contract of
insurance? In the cases before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the trust
company took the position that these promises were contracts of insurance,
basing its contention upon the theory that the engagement was in reality
an insurance of the liquidity of the trust investment, and an agreement to
make good any 1oss.12
The Pennsylvania court did not accept this view, and held these promises
were independent undertakings, and not contracts of insurance. The court
said: 8
"Its promise to repay has none of the elements of insurance,
which, generally speaking, is a contract of indemnity against loss
by the act of another."
This definition would exclude many kinds of insurance contracts. The loss
for which the insurer indemnifies need not be due to the act of another, but
may be any loss occasioned by war, depressions, tornadoes, etc.
But even if we accept the Court's definition, the contracts being considered can readily be made to fit into its pattern. What the trust company was
doing was to indemnify in its separate corporate capacity against any loss, by
itself as Trustee.
But whether or not promises by a trustee to guarantee payment of
interest and payment of cash upon revocation of the trusts are contracts of
12 Bowers, Executor, v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 285 U.S. 182, in which the Court
said: "Undoubtedly the guarantees contained in the policies and participation certificates
were in legal effect contracts of insurance. Tebbets v. Mercantile Credit Guarantee Co.,
73 Fed. 95, 97; Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics' Bank & Trust Co., 80 Fed. 766, 772;
State ex rel. Peach C. v. Bonding & Surety Co., 279 Mo. 535, 553, 556; 215 S.W.
20; Peoples v. Potts, 264 I11.522, 527; 106 N.E. 524; People v. Rose, 174 Ill. 310
51 N.E. 246; Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149, 160; Shakman v. United
States Credit System Co., 92 Wis. 366, 374; 66 N.W. 528; Young v. American Bonding
Co., 228 Pa. 373, 380; 77 At. 623."
iSRobert's Trust Estatt. 316 Pa. 545.
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insurance or independent promises, (why not both?) does not. fundamentally alter
the problem.
The important factor is that the emphasis on the faithful management and
conservation of the trust res, which has always been the primary duty of a
trustee, is weakened. If the trustee is bound by such agreements to return the
cash placed with it as a trust fund, it does not matter what investment is made.
If the agreement provides that the investment must be in such securities as
are legal for investment of trust funds, and the trustee disregards this admonition and invests in stock, no one would be injured if the trust company were
solvent, because the liability, upon revocation of the trust, to return the full
amount of cash invested, transcends and obliterates all other liability. If the stock
doubles in value, the well-recognized principle that the accretion belongs to the
beneficiary, would undoubtedly be invoked and the agreement to repay the
principal in cash would be disregarded. But if a loss incurs from a proper investment. the agreement becomes operative.
We have then the situation that if the trustee, under such an agreement,
invests in mortgages or interests in mortgages, and the investment is carefully
made and protected by intelligent supervision and solicitous care for the interest of the cestui que trust, the duty of the trustee is not discharged. If the
mortgage cannot be liquidated, upon revocation of the trust, the trustee must
nevertheless pay cash. If the mortgage can be sold, but for less than thq face
value, the trustee must pay the difference between the amount invested and
the present value of the investment. There is obviously no necessity for
careful scrutiny of investments or fidelity in management of the trust res.
True, the trust company will-become the owner of the trust investment, if
it must pay cash to the withdrawing beneficiary, but this 'is a. possibility only.
And a trustee need not be as careful with its own property as with that of a
cestui que trust. The vital aspect of the problem is the weakening, if not
the destruction, of the traditional responsibility of a trustee.
An independent promise by a trustee to guarantee the investment made by
it, by its very nature destroys the entire law applicable to trusts. It is inconsistent with the trust relationship which exists during the life of the trust; at
its termination there emerges a debtor-creditor relationship and the rights of
the parties are determined, not by the fidelity with which the trustee
managed the trust, but by an independent promise which he made. There lies the
dilemma. The independent promise to pay cash completely obliterates the trust
relationship on which it is founded.
It seems clear that promises by a trustee to invest trust funds for a donor,
and to act as his trustee, and in addition to guarantee the return in cash,
upon the revocation of the trust, of the investment, are incompatible
promises and injurious to the trust relationship.
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When, moreover, the promises .are made by a corporate trustee, the in-,
congruity is emphasized.
Banks and trust companies have statutory powers, and under familiar
principles are classed as quasi-public institutions, with only those powers
which are expressly given them by statute or necessarily implied. 14
An investigation of the statutes"f controlling the powers of the trust
company involved in the cases before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reveals no power to insure trust funds or to indemify donors of trusts for
losses in investments. The Act of 1895, P. L. 127, authorizes trust companies
"to take, accept and execute trusts of every description not inconsistent with
the laws of this State or of the United States . .."
The Supreme Court held such independent promises as part of the trust
relation, and as such not inconsistent with the laws of Pennsylvania.
The authority to execute trusts of every description cannot mean trusts
with independent promises of indemnity. For such promises are not the
promises of a fiduciary, but the undertakings of an independent promisor.
Such obligation is inconsistent with the trust relationship; it, is entirely alien to
the exercise of fiduciary functions. The assumption of such a liability, is certainly not to be implied from the grant of fiduciary powers or the authority
to execute trusts of every description. The trust company has assumed a dual
role.
The trust company's position from the beginning of the litigation involving these so-called guarantees was that the independent promise was ultra
vires. This position had been upheld in other jurisdictions where similar questions arose. 16
Two pertinent and well-reasoned cases are Reichert v. Metropolitan Trast
Co., 262 Mich., 123 (247 N. W. 128), decided in March, 1933, and Knass
v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 I1. 554 (188 N. E. 836) decided
in December, 1933.17

In the former case, the trust company guaranteed the principal and interest
of bonds secured by mortgages. The court held such guarantees ultra vires and
void, there being no express statutory authority for such undertaking, and found
it contrary to public policy and hazardous for the trust company to "divert its
lFletcher

on

Private

Corporations:

Section

3422.

lSAct of 1862, P.L. 116; Act of 1870, P.L. 1012; Act of 1895, P.L. 399; Act of
1907, P. L. 382, Act of 1913, P.L. 971; Act of 1923, P.L. 248.
16Federal Land Bank v. Crookston Trust Co., 180 Minn. 319; Greene v. First. National Bank, 172 Minn. 310; Peoples National Bank v. So. States Finance Co., 192 "N.C.
69 (133 S.E. 415); Nowell, et al.v. Equitable Trust Co.. 249 Mass. 585 (144 N.E. 749);
Dewey Column & Mon. Works v. Ryan, 206 Iowa Rep. 1100 (221 N.W. 800).
7
1 Followed in Hoffman v. Sears Community 'State Bank. 191 N.E. 280.
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funds from lawful corporate purposes to those unlawful and opposed to
public policy". 13

In the latter case, the bank agreed to repurchase first mortgage bonds at
any time that the purchasers wished to return them. These contracts were held
ultra vires the bank, and against public policy."
The Pennsylvania court refused to sustain the defense of ultra vires, although in the lower court,2 0 the opinion had competently and thoroughly
commented upon its applicability to quasi-public corporations. The Supreme
ISReichert v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 262 Mich. Rep. 123, at p. 131: "Like
other corporations this trust company is a creature of law. It may lawfully exercise no
power and authority except that given to it by law. There is nothing either in the charter of the corporation or the statute of its organization which gives it any express power
or authority to guarantee the payment of notes, bonds or other obligations. Its implied
powers are limited to those necessary to enable it to exercise the powers delegated to it
by its charter and the statutd providing for its creation. 2 Fletcher on Corporations, p.
1814. It occupies a fiduciary relation to the beneficiaries of the several trusts lawfully reposed in it who are entitled to its protection. 2 Fletcher, p. 1814. It has no right to
speculate with the trust funds entrusted to its care."
Again, p. 132: "It would be anomalous if the trust company, by violating the law
guaranteeing the payment of bonds, engaging in hazardous speculation, with or without
compensation, contrary to its charter, in violation of public policy, when such bonds were
purchased by those charged with notice of the trust company's lack of power, could,
as aainst the creditors and beneficiaries of the lawful trusts reposed in and accepted by
it,dlivert its funds from lawful corporate purposes to those unlawful and opposed to

public9 policy."

1 Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 Il. p. 554; at p. 565: "An outstanding characteristic of such an agreement as is before us is that it creates against
the bank a contingent liability which cannot be measured or determined in prospect and
can be determined day by day only by reading the shifting market value of the partic.'
ular bonds guaranteed. Such contingent liability is not, and cannot be, accurately reported to the public officers having a right to a report upon the condition of such
bank ..
.....
Speculation by a banking corporation with the funds deposited with it
and its entry into the guaranty or surety business are neither within the principles of
sound banking business nor the powers conferred by the statute under which it is organized; yet to insure the price of bonds, as was attempted by this agreement, isnothing short of a guaranty, and possesses an inherent evil not found even in speculation, in that the bank cannot hope to repurchase such bonds while they command,.'a market price higher than that fixed in such agreement, hence no chance of gain exists. The
guaranty of such bonds is not a transaction ordinarily and commonly considered to bs
within the scope of general banking business as that term is commonly used and understood, and cannot be said to come within the power conferred by the statute quoted, to
do a general banking business. Nor is such power a necessary incident to the powers
granted. Reichert v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 262 Mich. 123, 247 N.W. 128; Federal
Land Bank of St. Paul v. Crookston Trust Co., 180 Minn. 319; 230 N.W. 791; First
State Bank v. Sanford (Tex. Co. App.) 255 S.W. 640; Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings
Bank v. Crookston State Bank, 169 Minn. 249, 210 N.W. 998; Hawkins Realty Co. v.
Hawkins State Bank, 205 Wis. 406, 236 N. W. 657. Since this is so, it must be held
that under the rule hereinbefore cited such power is prohibited. As often stated by this
Court, one dealing with a banking or other corporation having limited and delegate,!
powers is chargeable with notice of those powers and their limitation."

S2Oobet',

Estat,

6Z

Pitts. L. J. 141.
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Court was induced by the growing tendency to discount ultra vires to disregard it in these cases. 21 In doing so, it failed to distinguish between private corporations and quasi-public ones having a unique responsibility to the
public, in addition to their duty to stockholders.
In the cases before the court there was evidence that trust agreements
similar to those before the court had been made by the appellee. covering
millions of dollars of trust funds. Clearly, the payment of large sums to
withdrawing cestuis que trustents and the assumption of millions of dollars
of delinquent mortgages would be detrimental, not only to the capital struciture of a financial institution, but in violation of the statutes governing banks
and trust companies. Although the bank involved was a large institution, able
to assume so heavy an obligation, the result was nevertheless contrary to sound
banking practice.
That the defense of ultra vires is available to quasi-public institutions
requires no extensive citation of authority, nor extended analysis or argument.
The law has always recognized the distinction and although the ultra vires
doctrine is disappearing from the law of private corporations, it will not depart,
although it may be transformed to a "contrary to public policy" rule in the
22
case of quasi-public corporations.
In Pennsylvania in 1933, codes were drafted and adopted for Private
-Business Corporations and for Banks and Trust Companies. The code for the
former expressly withdraws the defense of ultra vires from private cor24
porations. 28 On the other hand, the Banking Code has no such provisions.
As the codes were drawn at the same time and under the same) Attorney-General, this difference is indicative of an acknowledgment of the dissimilarity
between private and quasi-public corporations, and an affirmance of the doctrine that ultra vires is available to the latter corporations.
Another fallacy in the reasoning of the Supreme Court lies in its application of the rule that where a corporation has received the benefit of a
transaction, it may not plead ultra vires. The court held that, as the trustee in
the cases before it had received a trustee's compensation, it had received
a benefit which estopped it from pleading ultra vires.
The benefit theory is predicated upon a contract under which something of value passes from the promisor to the promisee, and the promisee
must deliver the consideration to the promisor, if he wishes to retain the res
about which the transaction occurs. There must be a quid pro quo, an exchange
by which one party to the contract accepts as its own something belonging
2iCarpenter, Should

the

Doctrine

of

Ultra Vires

Law Journal 49.
22Fletcher on Private Corporations, Section
2$Act of 1933, P.L. 364, Section 303.
2&Act of 1933, P.. 624.

3422.

be

Discarded?,

(1923)

33

Yale
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to the, other prior to the contractual relationship. Of course the law does not
permit such unjust enrichment, and insists upon a reimbursement of the promisor for his loss by an adherence to the contract by the promisee, even if beyond
the powers of a corporate promisee.
But how can this theory be satisfactorily applied to a trust relationship?
The res about which the relationship extends never passes into the ownership of
the trust company. The latter holds it only as an agent, except that it has legal
title, but the beneficial ownership, the benefit in the transaction, remains in
the donor. The only conceivable benefit to the trustee is its compensation,
which, under the agreements in the cases involved, was 5% of income only. This
payment was for a service to the res, and was not a receipt of the substance of
the contract. It was for a service which the trust company had performed, the
receipt of the trust fund, its investment in mortgages, its management, the
payment of income to the cestui que trust, etc. There was nothing that formerly belonged to one party which had passed to the other without consideration.
No benefit which it could not lawfully retain without performing its
part of the contract was retained by the trust company, making it necessary to
perform the contract, though ultra vires.
The court in its opinion merely states the rule without commenting on
its applicability to the facts. The distinction was, however, noted in the Knas.r
case, supra, where the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
"But it is said the old bank, having received the purchase. price
of these bonds, is estopped from setting up the defense of ultra
vires . . . Numerous cases of other jurisdictions have been cited
to support the contention that the old bank, having received the
purchase price paid for these bonds, is estopped to set up the
defense of ultra vires without first returning the money paid it. We
have seen, however, that these bonds were not the bonds of the
bank, and it will be presumed that the mortgagor, a real estate
corporation executing the bonds, received the amount paid by
claimants, less commissions charged for the sale. At most, if such
contention be sound, the bank could not be required to return more
than the commissions received, the amount of which is not disdosed by the record."
The Supreme Court in its opinion saw no distinction between the performanee of a promise to pay cash and a surcharge for mismanagement. The
difference would seem to be fundamental. The former, is a liability assumed
in good faith; the latter, a penalty for bad faith. The object of the surcharge is to penalize the trustee, to outlaw mismanagement; in short, to make
it impossible for a trustee to survive. How can this objective, which every trustee
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seeks strenuously to avoid, be cofnpared with a functional performance which
a trustee has voluntarily assumed to the extent of millions of dollars?
The court, with a natural impulse to make the trustee pay, because it
said it would, has ignored the basic legal principles involved. Although the
decision serves at the present time to dissuade trustees from entering into agreements guaranteeing the return of trust funds in cash (which, of course, they
would not do under present conditions in any case), it may have a far-reaching and damaging effect with the return of prosperity. If trust companies can, by
the promise to return trust funds in cash upon revocation of the trust, play
havoc with the investment and in effect treat it as a deposit without adhering
to the laws governing the investment of deposits, the harm done by this decision is irreparable. It strikes at the heart of the trust relationship and sets at
naught the duty and responsibility of a trustee. It permits the trustee by a
blanket promise of indemnity, to treat the trust funds as its own. Not only
that; it endangers the money of the public deposited in the banking department
of the trust company by exposing it to undreamed of banking haiards. It
permits a contingent liability which is not reflected in the statement of the
bank's financial condition. It sanctions a gift of money to the beneficiaries of
trusts, in return for which the bank receives only delinquent or depreciated investments, and a small compensation.
It is believed that the court, in its preoccupation with thc, impositiori of
liability where it had been voluntarily assumed, permitted the basic legal principles involved to become obscured, with the result that Pennsylvania stands
alone in approving the assumption by trust companies of a liability to return
trust funds in cash, upon demand, regardless of the condition or character of the
trust investment at the time of the revocation of the trust.
In arriving at its decision, the court probably considered these transactions
as similar to deposits. But, of course, such similarity does not exist. When a depositor leaves his money at a bank, he parts with all title to it and it becomes
a part of the assets of the bank to be used and invested as the bank sees fit
for the benefit of all the depositors and stockholders. When a donor creates
a trust he parts only with the naked legal title; he remains the beneficial owner
of the fund or of the investment into which it is converted. The assets of
the trust company are not increased and no benefit accrues to it except the
earning of a small commission. Should the trust company fail, the depositor is
entitled to only a pro rata share of the assets of the bank, whereas the donor of
the trust is entitled to his entire investment. In the case of a deposit the bank
exercises the right of complete ownership over the fund; in the case of the
trust, the trust company acts as a fiduciary only.
It follows that the obligation to repay trust funds in cash, when the
investments though proper, are not capable of liquidation, is a heavy obligation for the assumption of which the trust company has received no assets.
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The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania imposing this enormous obligation on the banking facilities of the state is particularly disturbing in view of its previous reluctance to impose similar burdens.
25
In the recent case of the Globe Indemnity Company v. WiM. A4cCullom,
the court definitely took the position that ultra vires contracts would not
be enforced. A lumber company had guaranteed the completion of a large
ipartment building. The court refused to enforce the guaranty, holding that
it was beyond the scope of the corporate powers of the lumber company. To
enforce it would be to jeopardize its capital and to invite its destruction, said
the court.
That case was distinguished from the cases under consideration by the
court with the indication that in the lumber company case no benefit was
received from the guaranty, but in the trust company cases a benefit was received.
A moment's comparison of the two transactions makes it clear that the
benefit which a lumber company receives from guaranteeing the completion
of an apartment house for which its lumber is used must be far greater than the
57o commission .on income which a trustee receives under a trust agreement.
If "it is inviting destruction" for a lumber company to guarantee the debt
of another, is it not far more dangerous for a trust company to expose the
capital of the corporation and the money of depositors to the contingent liability
of paying cash to beneficiaries of trusts regardless of the condition of the
trust estate?
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26313

Pa.

135.

Ella Graubart

